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Abstract
We study the role of vertical structure in determining generating ca-
pacities and retail prices in the electricity industry. Allowing for uncer-
tain demand, we compare three market configurations: (i) integrated
monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) sep-
arated duopoly with wholesale trade. We find that equilibrium capac-
ities and retail prices are such that welfare is highest (lowest) under
separated (integrated) duopoly. The driving force behind this result
is the risk of rent extraction faced by competing integrated generators
on the wholesale market. Our analysis suggests that vertical structure
plays an important role in determining generating capacities and retail
prices.
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1 Introduction
Electricity markets around the world have been restructured in an effort
to improve their performance. In several countries, legislators have allowed
competition into statutory integrated monopoly and implemented regula-
tions such as vertical unbundling to safeguard entrants and consumers from
potentially harmful strategic behavior by integrated generators.1 Yet, no
consensus seems to have emerged as to which market configuration works
best. A particular concern is that allowing competition into electricity mar-
kets might undermine investments in generating capacity (see, e.g., Joskow
(2006), and Joskow and Tirole (2006)).
In this paper, we study the role of vertical market structure in determining
investments in electricity generating capacity, retail prices, and welfare. We
compare three market configurations that vary with respect to vertical mar-
ket structure and the extent to which firms compete at the wholesale and the
retail level: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale
trade, and (iii) separated duopoly with wholesale trade. Throughout the
analysis, we allow for uncertain demand at the retail level.
A key feature of our analysis is that both capacity decisions and retail prices
are determined before the state of retail demand is known. After retail
demand is realized, the wholesale price for electricity is determined in a
uniform-price auction due to von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993),
and deliveries and payments are exchanged. This setting implies that whole-
sale prices react to changes in retail prices, whereas retail prices cannot react
to changes in wholesale prices. The timing reflects a peculiarity of the elec-
tricity industry: capacity decisions are made under uncertainty about future
demand, just as retail delivery contracts are signed before the state of de-
mand is realized. The wholesale market then attempts to balance supply
and demand based on available capacity and effective retail demand. Our
main analysis will assume that a blackout occurs if the balancing act in the
wholesale market fails. In an extension, we will also consider the case where
1In the UK, for example, the industry was vertically separated into three generating
firms, the National Grid company, and 12 regional distribution companies by the Elec-
tricity Act in 1989. However, some regional distribution companies later re-integrated
vertically into generation (Newbery, 1999, 2005). The Californian restructuring bill from
1996 also forced the regulated utilities to sell lots of their generation facilities (Borenstein,
2002). The European Union ruled in its Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity adopted on 26 June 2003 that electricity generat-
ing firms which are integrated into transmission and distribution have to be functionally
disintegrated.
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blackouts may be avoided by the rationing of retail demand.2
Our main results are the following. First, aggregate generating capacity
is highest under integrated duopoly and lowest under integrated monopoly.
The separated duopoly yields an intermediate level of generating capacity.
The driving force behind this result is the rent extraction risk faced by an
integrated duopoly generator: if individual capacity turns out to be too small
to serve own retail demand, an integrated generator must buy electricity
from its competitor in the wholesale market, thereby fully dissipating its
rent. To avoid this outcome, an integrated duopoly generator will not only
choose a large generating capacity, but also set a high retail price. Vertical
separation eliminates this risk of rent extraction, as electricity generators are
not committed to serve an uncertain demand at a pre-determined retail price.
As a result, retail prices are lower and demand is higher than under vertical
integration. In effect, vertical separation reduces the investment-enhancing
effect of introducing competition into statutory monopoly, but does not fully
eliminate it.
Second, equilibrium retail prices are lowest under separated duopoly and
highest under integrated duopoly. The integrated monopoly yields an in-
termediate level of retail prices. Intuitively, the result follows again from
the risk of rent extraction, which induces an integrated generator to charge a
higher retail price. This result supports the notion that allowing competition
into the electricity industry (alone) does not necessarily reduce retail prices.
Third, the combined effects of restructuring on investments in generating
capacities and retail prices are such that social welfare is highest under
separated duopoly and lowest under integrated duopoly. The integrated
monopoly yields an intermediate level of social welfare. To understand the
intuition for this result, note that irrespective of market configuration capac-
ity is always large enough to satisfy retail demand at the relevant retail price
(i.e., blackouts do not occur in equilibrium). This implies that low capac-
ity investments do not have an adverse effect on welfare per se. Increasing
capacity investments has two effects. (i) it raises generation costs without
improving supply security; (ii) it increases the maximum level of retail de-
mand that can be served without causing blackouts. To benefit from higher
capacities, retail prices must decrease, which requires a restructuring from
integrated monopoly to separated duopoly. Therefore, the welfare ranking is
essentially a reversed ranking of the price levels under the various industry
configurations.
Allowing for rationing of the retail demand does not undermine our analy-
2See section 5.1.
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sis. The equilibrium outcome for the integrated duopoly remains unaffected,
as the risk of rent extraction induces firms to choose capacities which make
rationing unnecessary. In the other market configuration, equilibrium capac-
ities and retail prices are no longer distorted upwards to avoid blackouts.
Instead, some rationing occurs for very high demand realization, leading to
a lower supply security compared to the integrated duopoly. Yet, this higher
supply security affects the welfare ranking of the integrated duopoly config-
uration only for very low capacity costs.
Our paper contributes to the extensive literature on the impact of demand
uncertainty on capacity choices (Drèze and Sheshinski (1976), Gabszewicz
and Poddar (1997), von der Fehr and Harbord (1997), Castro-Rodriguez et al.
(2009), Boom (2002) and (2009), Borenstein and Holland (2005)), Murphy
and Smeers (2005), and Grimm and Zoettl (2013)). The key difference to
this literature is that we focus on the role of vertical market structure in
determining capacity choices.
We also contribute to the much scarcer literature on the competitive effects of
changing the electricity industry’s vertical structure. Previous contributions
to this strand of the literature focus either on the loss of vertical economies
due to the separation of generation and distribution of electricity (see e.g.
Kwoka et al. (2010) and Kwoka (2002)), or on the effect of forward contracts
on the wholesale prices (see e.g. Bushnell (2007), Mansur (2007), Bushnell
et al. (2008), de Frutos and Fabra (2012) and Bosco et al. (2012)). None of
these papers studies the role of vertical structure in determining the invest-
ments in generating capacities.3 We identify a new effect, the risk of rent
extraction associated with vertical integration, as an important determinant
of investments in generating capacities.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
analytical framework. Section 3 discusses the benchmark cases of social opti-
mum, integrated monopoly, and integrated duopoly. Section 3.4 studies the
equilibrium outcome under separated duopoly. Section 4 compares the vari-
ous market configurations and derives the main results. Section 5 discusses
some limitations and explores rationing at the retail level as an extension.
Section 6 concludes.
3Some authors interpret the integration of electricity generators into the retail market
as forward contracting in the tradition of Allaz and Villa (1993), abstracting from the fact
that vertically integrated firms commit on retail prices rather than retail quantities. It is
worth noting that their empirical observation of lower wholesale prices with vertical inte-
gration is in line with our model if firms successfully avoid rent extraction (the wholesale
price is then low despite a high retail price).
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2 Analytical Framework
In this section, we outline the analytical framework for the various market
configurations considered below, building on Boom (2009) and Boom (2007).
2.1 Demand
Suppose that customers’ surplus is given by
V (x, ε, r) = U(x, ε)− rx = x− ε− (x− ε)
2
2
− rx, (1)
where x ≥ 0 is the amount of electricity consumed, r ≥ 0 is the retail price
per unit of electricity, and ε is a demand shock, uniformly distributed on the
interval [0, 1].4 Maximizing V (x, ε, r) with respect to x yields the linear retail
demand for electricity
x(r, ε) = max{1 + ε− r, 0}. (2)
If there is more than one retailer, consumers subscribe to the retailer offering
the lowest retail price (electricity is a homogeneous good). If retail prices are
identical, consumers choose each retailer with equal probability.
2.2 Supply
We will compare three market configurations that differ in the number of
active firms and the vertical market structure and the social optimum:5
(i) social optimum;
(ii) integrated monopoly ;
(iii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade: Two integrated firms can buy
and sell electricity on the wholesale market and serve retail demand;
(iv) separated duopoly with wholesale trade: Two separated generators sell
to the wholesale market, and two separated retailers buy from the
wholesale market to serve retail demand.
4This specification implies that a positive demand shock (ε > 0) is associated with a
negative effect on consumer surplus. Our key results do not depend on this specification
(see section 5.2 below for a discussion).
5We abstract from the chain of (vertically separated) monopolies, which does not give
rise to a sensible market configuration in our setting.
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For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of generating electricity
is constant and normalized to zero. The total cost of electricity generator
i = A,B is then given by
C(ki) = zki, (3)
where z is the constant unit cost of capacity and ki is the generating capacity
installed by firm i.6 We assume that capacity cost z satisfies
0 ≤ z < 1
2
(4)
to ensure strictly positive capacity investments in all market configurations.
For simplicity, we further assume that the marginal cost of selling electricity
to consumers is constant and normalized to zero
2.3 Timing
The timing reflects some key features of the electricity industry. We first
consider the duopoly configurations, which presume the following five stages:
(1) In the first stage, generators i = A,B decide on capacities ki before
retail demand is known. In the integrated duopoly, capacity decisions
are taken simultaneously. In the separated duopoly, we consider both
simultaneous and sequential capacity decisions (assuming that A moves
before B).
(2) In the second stage, retailers ` = C,D simultaneously set retail prices r`
in the separated duopoly, whereas generators i = A,B simultaneously
set retail prices ri in the integrated duopoly. Consumers buy from the
firm with the lower retail price, or, if prices are identical, from each
firm with equal probability.
(3) In the third stage, the demand shock ε ∈ [0, 1] is realized. Since retail
prices are already set, retail demand is fixed henceforth.
(4) In the fourth stage, generators bid prices pA and pB for their full capac-
ity ki, i = A,B to an auctioneer. The auctioneer determines the mar-
ket clearing wholesale price p (if such a price exists) and the amount
of electricity generators may supply to the grid.
6Firm indices may be ignored if there is only one generator.
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(5) Finally, in the fifth stage, if supply and demand are balanced, deliv-
eries and payments are exchanged. If supply and demand cannot be
balanced, a blackout occurs and market exchange is interrupted.
The monopoly configuration and the social welfare benchmark reflect the
timing in the duopoly scenarios as closely as possible. In particular, both the
social planner and the integrated monopoly must choose their capacity and
retail price before retail demand is known.
2.4 Wholesale Market
As the wholesale price is determined after the retail price, the timing is
reversed relative to the standard literature on vertically related markets.
This reversion reflects the peculiarity that retailers must specify the terms
of delivery before retail demand is known and then buy electricity on behalf
of their customers on the wholesale market. That is, the retail market clears
in the long run, whereas the wholesale market clears in the short run. Even
though the wholesale price cannot affect retail prices, it is an important
determinant of investments in generating capacity, as it affects the returns
on investment for electricity generators. To fix ideas, we assume that the
wholesale price is determined by a uniform-price auction due to von der
Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993).7 Uniform-price auctions were used for
the Electricity Pool in England and Wales before the reform in 2001, and are
still in use elsewhere (e.g., for the Nord Pool in Scandinavia, or the Spanish
wholesale market).8
The uniform-price auction we employ requires each firm i to bid a price pi at
which it is willing to supply its total capacity.9 The auctioneer then attempts
to balance supply and demand on the grid, arranging the bids in ascending
order and determining the marginal bid which equates supply and demand.10.
The price of the marginal bid is the spot market price paid to all generators
7An alternative approach, based on Klemperer and Meyer (1989), has been suggested
by Green and Newbery (1992). They assume that firms bid differentiable supply functions,
whereas von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993) assume that they bid step functions.
8See Bergman et al. (1999), Crampes and Fabra (2005) and Newbery (2005).
9That is, we abstract from the problem of strategic capacity withholding (see Crampes
and Creti (2005), and Le Coq (2002)).
10For simplicity, we ignore transmission constraints, although they might interact with
constraints in the generating capacity. See Wilson (2002) for insights into this problem
and for the analysis of isolated transmission constraints Borenstein et al. (2000), Joskow
and Tirole (2000) and Léautier (2001)
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for each unit that is dispatched on the grid (irrespective of individual bids).11
The capacity of suppliers bidding below the spot market price is dispatched
completely, whereas the marginal supplier delivers the residual amount which
equates supply and demand.12
Since neither retail demand nor generating capacities can react to changes
in the wholesale price, the auctioneer may fail to find a wholesale price that
equates supply and demand. In this case, a blackout occurs, and market
exchange is interrupted.13 In section 5.1, we also consider the case where
blackouts are avoided by rationing at the retail level.
3 Alternative Market Configurations
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes for the various
market configurations, drawing in part from Boom (2009) and Boom (2007).
3.1 Social Optimum
The social planner’s capacity choice can be derived from the maximization of
the social welfare function with respect to the retail price r and the capacity
level k, respectively. Social welfare is given by
W (r, k) =

∫ 1
0
U(x(r, ε), ε)dε− zk if r ≥ 2− k,∫ k−1+r
0
U(x(r, ε), ε)dε
+
∫ 1
k−1+r U(0, ε)− zk if 2− k > r ≥ max{1− k, 0},∫ 1
0
U(0, ε)− zk if 1− k > r ≥ 0,
(5)
where U(·) is the consumer surplus and x(r, ε) is retail demand (from equa-
tions (1) and (2), respectively). The first segment ofW (r, k) is relevant when
the retail price r is sufficiently large for retail demand to be smaller than ca-
pacity, even for the highest possible demand shock ε = 1.14 The second
11Note the difference to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), where the undercutting firm
receives its own price per unit sold even if its capacity is too low to serve the market, so
that some customers have to pay the price of the competitor with the next higher price.
12In line with Wilson (2002) we consider an integrated system because participation in
the auction is compulsory if a generating firm wants to sell electricity.
13Under separated duopoly, a blackout will also occur if the wholesale price is larger
than the retail price (p > r). In this case, retailers must declare bankruptcy and exit the
market, so that generators can no longer sell electricity.
14In this case, the condition k ≥ (1 + ε − r) becomes equal to r ≥ 2 − k. The lower
bound of the integral assures a positive demand.
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segment is relevant when r is in an intermediate range, such that demand
is smaller than capacity for the lowest possible demand shock ε = 0 but
larger than capacity for the highest possible demand shock ε = 1.15 Finally,
the third segment is relevant if the retail price is low enough for demand to
exceed capacity even for the smallest possible demand shock ε = 0. For this
setting, one can show that the optimal retail price satisfies r = max{2−k, 0}.
Substituting this price into the social welfare function and maximizing with
respect to total capacity k yields proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (social optimum) The welfare maximizing retail price and
generating capacity, respectively, are given by rs = z and ks = 2− z.
Proof: Boom (2007), Appendix B.
Note that the retail price (generating capacity, respectively) is increasing
(decreasing) in capacity costs. In addition, the optimal retail price is such
that there are no blackouts.
3.2 Integrated Monopoly
The integrated monopoly chooses the retail price rm and the capacity level
km so as to maximize expected profits16
pi(r, k) =

∫ 1
max{r−1,0} r(1 + ε− r)dε− zk, if r ≥ 2− k,∫ k−1+r
max{r−1,0} r(1 + ε− r)dε− zk, if max{0, 1− k} ≤ r < 2− k,
−zk, if r ≤ max{0, 1− k}.
Maximizing w.r.t. the retail price yields r = max{2 − k, 3/4}. Substituting
back into expected profits and maximizing w.r.t. capacity yields proposition
2.
Proposition 2 (integrated monopoly) The profit maximizing retail price
and generating capacity, respectively, are given by rm = 3
4
+ z
2
and km = 5
4
− z
2
.
Proof: Boom (2007), Appendix A.
Again, the retail price (generating capacity) is increasing (decreasing) in
capacity costs. The retail price is higher and capacity lower than in the
social optimum, but again there are no blackouts.
15The former requires r ≥ max{0, 1− k}, and the latter r < 2− k. The upper bound of
the integral assures that there is no blackout (i.e., capacity is sufficient to satisfy demand).
16The different segments of the monopoly’s profit function can be explained in the same
way as the segments of the social welfare function.
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3.3 Integrated Duopoly
Integrated duopoly generators i = A,B are active both in the retail market
and the wholesale market. The wholesale price is determined by a uniform-
price auction. When the auction is held, aggregate retail demand is fixed
and given by x(rid, ε), where rid = min{rA, rB} is the equilibrium retail price
under integrated duopoly. Firm i’s retail demand, in turn, is
di(rA, rB, ε) =

x(ri, ε) if ri < rj,
1
2
x(ri, ε) if ri = rj,
0 if ri > rj,
, with i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. (6)
3.3.1 Wholesale Market and the Rent Extraction Risk
If aggregate capacity is sufficient to satisfy demand, i.e. kA + kB ≥ x(rid, ε),
the wholesale price is given by
p(pA, pB) = pi
{
if pi < pj and ki ≥ x(rid, ε) or
if pi ≥ pj and kj < x(rid, ε) ≤ kA + kB. (7)
If aggregate capacity is insufficient to satisfy demand, the auctioneer cannot
find a wholesale price which equates supply and demand, and a blackout
occurs. The price bids pA and pB also determine the wholesale volume that
generator i can sell, which is given by
yi(pA, pB) =

min{ki, x(rid, ε)} if pi < pj,
min{ki,x(rid,ε)}
2
+
max{0,x(rid,ε)−kj}
2
if pi = pj,
max{0, x(rid, ε)− kj} if pi > pj,
(8)
with i, j = A,B and i 6= j.
Using (7) and (8), integrated generator i’s revenues are given by
pii(ri, rj) = ridi(ri, rj, ε) + p(pi, pj) [yi(pi, pj)− di(ri, rj, ε)] . (9)
Equation (9) shows that an integrated generator earns the retail price ri times
retail demand di, plus the wholesale price p times the difference between the
wholesale volume yi and retail demand di. As a consequence, an integrated
duopoly generator faces a rent extraction risk : if its retail demand exceeds
own wholesale capacity, the integrated generator becomes a net payer in the
wholesale market. A competitor who can fill the gap will bid the maximum
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price for selling its capacity, such that the net payer will forgo its rent. As
we will show below, this risk induces integrated duopoly generators to charge
relatively high retail prices and make large capacity investments. The whole-
sale price is zero if both firms are able to cover their retail demand, whereas
the market breaks down if aggregate capacity cannot cover total demand.17
3.3.2 Retail Market
In the retail market, an integrated duopolist has three pricing options: First,
it can undercut its competitor and corner the market. This strategy generates
revenues if the demand shock is such that retail demand is positive and the
undercutting generator’s capacity is sufficiently large to serve it. Second, it
can match the price of its competitor, splitting aggregate retail demand in
half. Expected revenues then depend on the competitors’ relative capacities:
for the smaller firm, revenues are as in the undercutting case, except that
it serves only half of the demand. For the firm with the larger capacity,
however, revenues are different, as it can appropriate the rival’s rent if its
capacity is sufficiently large to make up for a lack of capacity of the smaller
firm. Third, it can surcharge its competitor, in which case it will not attract
retail subscribers. It will nevertheless make revenues if the competitor cannot
serve aggregate retail demand and own capacity is sufficiently large to cover
the gap at the wholesale level. More formally, equilibrium retail prices satisfy
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (retail prices) Depending on capacity levels (ki, kj), i, j =
A,B, i 6= j, there are the following Nash equilibria in retail prices.
(i) With symmetric capacities ki = kj = k <
√
5/2, the pareto-dominant
Nash equilibrium results in symmetric retail prices
rid = ri = rj =
 2−
√
2k if 0 ≤ k < 1/√2,
1
2
(3−√4k2 − 1) if 1√
2
≤ k < 1/√5/2. (10)
(ii) With capacities not too asymmetric, the unique Nash equilibrium results
in symmetric retail prices rid = ri = rj = 0.
(iii) With asymmetric capacities and kj < max{(ki − 1)/2, 18}, the pareto-
dominant Nash equilibrium results in rid = ri = max{34 , 2− ki} < rj.
17The wholesale prices are explicitly derived in lemma 1 of Boom (2009).
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(iv) If 1
8
≤ kj < (ki− 1)/2, the pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium results in
rid = ri = rj = 1− 2kj.
(v) If ki 6= kj and ki + kj < 1, the equilibria cannot be pareto ranked, but
they are payoff-equivalent as both firms realize zero revenues.
Proof: See Boom (2007), Appendix C.
With symmetric and limited capacities (case (i)), there is a common retail
price for which both firms are indifferent between undercutting, matching,
and surcharging their competitor. This forms a pareto-dominant Nash equi-
librium. With slightly asymmetric capacities (case (ii)), both firms want to
undercut (surcharge) the rival if he sets a high (low) price. Only the low
capacity firm wants to match in an intermediate retail price range where
the high capacity firm directly switches from surcharging to undercuttung.
Therefore, the only remaining Nash equilibrium is the Bertrand outcome. For
very asymmetric capacities (case (iii)), the large-capacity firm can charge the
monopoly price on the expected demand without inducing the rival to match
its price, because the small-capacity firm will not be able to serve even half of
the demand. With slightly less asymmetric capacities, the larger firm sets a
price that induces the smaller firm to match it, even though it cannot satisfy
its demand (case (iv)). Finally if capacities are asymmetric and relatively
small, firms can also generate a Bertrand outcome by pricing low enough to
generate blackouts all the time (case (v)).
3.3.3 Capacities
Using the retail prices from proposition 3, the following capacity choices
emerge. If the competitor’s capacity is very low, an integrated duopolist can
either choose a very large capacity and corner the market, or it can match
the competitor’s capacity to generate positive revenues (for any smaller own
capacity, revenues are zero). For a slightly larger competitor capacity, corner-
ing the market is no longer an option. Yet, positive revenues are still possible
if own capacity is chosen much larger than the competitor’s capacity. For
a still larger capacity of the competitor, positive revenues from installing a
higher capacity are no longer possible. Finally, for a very large competitor
capacity, own revenues are independent of own capacity. Solving for the
non-pareto-dominated Nash equilibria yields the following result.
Proposition 4 (capacity investments) Depending on capacity costs z, there
are the following pareto-dominant Nash equilibria in capacities.
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(i) For low capacity costs (0 ≤ z < 0.2118), there is a unique equilibrium
where firms choose capacity levels kA = kB = k̂, with
k̂ = argmaxk
{
1− 4k2 + 3√4k2 − 1
8
− zk
}
.
(ii) For intermediate capacity costs (0.2118 ≤ z ≤ 1/(2√2)), the non-pareto
dominated equilibria are characterized either by both firms choosing k̂,
or by one firm choosing the monopoly capacity km and the other firm
choosing 0.
(iii) For high capacity costs (1/(2
√
2) < z < 1
2
), there are two equilibria
with one firm choosing km and the other firm 0.
Proof: See Boom (2007), Appendix C.
Proposition 4 indicates that a unique pareto-dominant equilibrium exists only
for low capacity costs (case (i)). For intermediate capacity costs (case (ii)),
there are three non-dominated equilibria, one with symmetric capacities and
two in which only one firm invests (choosing monopoly capacity). For high
capacity costs (case (iii)) only the latter two exist.
3.4 Separated Duopoly
In this market configuration, two separated generators sell to the wholesale
market, while two separated retailers buy from the wholesale market and
serve retail demand. We employ backward induction to characterize the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
3.4.1 Wholesale Market
The wholesale price and the generators’ wholesale volumes are determined
using the same uniform-price auction as in the integrated duopoly con-
figuration. That is, if aggregate capacity is sufficient to satisfy demand,
kA + kB ≥ x(rsd, ε), the wholesale price is given by equation (7), with rid
replaced by rsd. Otherwise a blackout occurs. Similarly, wholesale volumes
are given by equation (8), with rid replaced by rsd.
Using the adapted versions of (7) and (8), the profit of a separated duopoly
generator i = A,B is given by
pii(pA, pB) = p(pA, pB)yi(pA, pB).
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Note that a separated duopoly generator does not face the risk of rent extrac-
tion, since it is not committed to serve any specific level of retail demand.
Best-response bidding now requires each generator to either undercut its
competitor, or to bid the maximum price pi = rsd at which retailers break
even. The next proposition characterizes the resulting Nash equilibria in
price bids.
Proposition 5 (wholesale prices) Depending on capacity levels (kA, kB)
and the retail price rsd, there are the following types of Nash equilibria in
price bids:
(i) If kA + kB < x(rsd, ε), any pair (pA, pB) forms a Nash equilibrium in
price bids. No wholesale price can equate supply and demand, and a
blackout occurs.
(ii) If ki ≥ x(rsd, ε) > kj, with i, j = A,B and i 6= j, the Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies is characterised by pi = rsd and pj < rsd(x(rsd, ε) −
kj)/ki. The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is psd = rsd, and firms
sell the quantities yi = x(rsd, ε)− kj and yj = kj.
(iii) If kA + kB ≥ x(rsd, ε) > max{kA, kB}, there are two types of Nash
equilibria in pure strategies: one with pA = rsd and pB < rsd(x(rsd, ε)−
kB)/kA, and another with pB = rsd and pA < rsd(x(rsd, ε) − kA)/kB.
The wholesale price is the same (psd = rsd) for both types of equilib-
ria, but the quantities sold in equilibrium differ: in the former yA =
x(rsd, ε) − kB and yB = kB, whereas in the latter yA = kA and yB =
x(rsd, ε)− kA.
(iv) If min{kA, kB} ≥ x(rsd, ε) the Nash equilibrium pA = pB = 0 is unique.
The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is psd = 0, and firms sell the
quantities yA = yB = x(rsd, ε)/2.
Proof: Follows from appendix A of Le Coq (2002) or the proofs of proposi-
tion 1-3 in Crampes and Creti (2005), using that marginal generating costs
are constant and normalized to zero by assumption and that the maximum
wholesale price with positive demand is p = rsd.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. Area A corresponds to case (i), where
demand exceeds aggregate capacity, so that a blackout occurs. Areas B and
D are associated with case (ii): In area B, firm A (B, respectively) is the
large (small) firm. In area D, these roles are reversed. In both cases, the
large firm bids the maximum price rsd, whereas the small firm bids just low
13
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Figure 1: Prices on the Wholesale Market
enough to avoid undercutting by the large firm. In area C, which corresponds
to case (iii), the difference in installed capacities is smaller than in either B
or D, and two types of equilibria are possible: Either the large or the small
firm bids the maximum price, and the other firm bids low enough to avoid
undercutting. In both cases the equilibrium wholesale price is psd = rsd.
Finally, area E corresponds to case (iv). Here, each firm’s capacity is sufficent
to satisfy aggregate demand. Therefore, price bidding yields a Bertrand-type
equilibrium.
Note that there are multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria for cases (i)–(iii),
as any lower bid that avoids undercutting and negative profits is admissible.
These equilibria are pay-off equivalent for cases (i) and (ii), but not for case
(iii), where the volume of dispatched electricity yi(pA, pB) depends on the
type of equilibrium played. To deal with this multiplicity problem, we impose
the following assumption:18
Assumption 1 If capacities satisfy kA + kB ≥ x(rsd, ε) > max{kA, kB},
generators coordinate on the Nash equilibrium where the large-capacity firm
bids the maximum price and the small-capacity firm bids low enough to avoid
undercutting by the large firm. If generators have equal capacities, they play
each type of equilibrium with equal probability.
18The assumption is equivalent to applying risk-dominance as a selection criterion. See
Boom (2008) for a detailed discussion.
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3.4.2 Retail Market
We first note that for retailers to obtain non-negative profits, the demand
shock must satisfy ε ∈ (ε, ε), where ε ≡ r−1 is the critical value below which
demand is zero, and ε ≡ min{kA, kB}+r−1 is the maximum value for which
generating capacities are large enough to avoid that generators extract rents
from retailers.
With this in mind, and recalling that retailers compete à la Bertrand, the
expected profits of retailer ` = C,D are given by
pi`(r`, rt) =

0 if r` > rt,
1
2
∫ max{0,min{ε¯,1}}
max{0,ε} r`(1 + ε− r`)dε if r` = rt,∫ max{0,min{ε¯,1}}
max{0,ε} r`(1 + ε− r`)dε if r` < rt,
(11)
with `, t = C,D, and ` 6= t. Equation (11) indicates that retailers under-
cut each other until they reach zero profits. Therefore, the following Nash
equilibrium in retail prices emerges.
Proposition 6 (retail prices) Depending on the capacity levels (kA, kB),
there are the following Nash equilibria in retail prices.
(i) If min{kA, kB} ≥ 1 there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
with rC = rD = 0.
(ii) If min{kA, kB} < 1 all pure-strategy Nash equilibria are characterised
by rC ≤ 1−min{kA, kB} and rD ≤ 1−min{kA, kB}.
Proof: Suppose that r` > rt with `, t = C,D and ` 6= t. This can only be
an equilibrium if rt ≤ 1 − min{kA, kB} and r` ≤ 1 − min{kA, kB}, because
otherwise firm ` could increase its profits by undercutting and firm t by
increasing its price. Suppose, alternatively, that r` = rt. Then either r` =
rt = 0 if min{kA, kB} ≥ 1, or r` = rt < 1−min{kA, kB} if min{kA, kB} < 1,
because otherwise each retailer could double its profit by undercutting.
Proposition (6) shows that, due to Bertrand competition, retailers cannot
realize strictly positive profits, no matter whether the equilibrium is unique
(case (i)) or not (case (ii)). In case (i) the generators’ minimum capacity
is not small enough to ensure that the rents are shifted from retailers to
the generators for all demand realizations at a positive retail price, meaning
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that the wholesale market equilibrium is for some small ε and all positive
retail prices always located in area E of figure 1. Therefore the retailers
compete each other down to r = 0 in a Bertrand type manner. In case (ii)
the minimum capacity of the generators is small enough that all rents are
shifted from the retailers to the generators at a positive retail price even if
the demand realization ε is close to zero. Thus, for the retail price range
given in (ii) the wholesale equilibrium is for all ε located in either A, B, C
or D meaning that the retailers realize zero profits before they compete the
retail prices down to zero. To deal with the multiplicity problem in case (ii),
we introduce the following assumption regarding equilibrium selection.
Assumption 2 If min{kA, kB} < 1, retailers choose the Nash equilibrium
with rC = rD = 1−min{kA, kB}.
Assumption 2 imposes that retailers select the equilibrium in which they
choose the highest possible price which generates zero profits.
3.4.3 Capacity Investments
Separated duopoly generators i = A,B must anticipate the impact of their
capacity choices ki on the retail market and the wholesale market. Due
to Bertrand competition at the retail level, potential rents are shifted to
generators. Provided that aggregate capacity exceeds retail demand, the
wholesale price is given by
psd = rsd = max{0, 1−min{kA, kB}}. (12)
With a strictly positive retail price rsd, demand is characterized by x(rsd, ε) =
1+ε−1+min{kA, kB} = ε+min{kA, kB}. Therefore, generator i’s expected
profits are given by
Πi(ki, kj) =

max{0, 1− kj}
∫ min{1,ki}
0
εdε− zki if ki > kj,
max{0,1−kj}
2
[∫ min{1,ki}
0
εdε+
∫ min{1,kj}
0
kidε
]
−zki if ki = kj,
max{0, 1− ki}
∫ min{1,kj}
0
kidε− zki if ki < kj,
(13)
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with i, j = A,B and i 6= j.19 To understand (13), suppose min{kA, kB} < 1
and x(rsd, ε) ≤ kA + kB, and first consider the case where ki > kj. Firm i
then bids high and serves residual demand max{x(r∗, ε)− kj, 0} = max{1 +
ε − 1 + kj − kj, 0} = ε. Next, consider the case where ki < kj: Firm i
now bids low and delivers its total capacity up to the level of demand (i.e.,
min{ki, 1+ε−1+ki} = ki). Finally, if capacities are identical (ki = kj), firm i
bids high or low with probability one half each. As noted above, the condition
x(rsd, ε) ≤ kA + kB must hold, since generators cannot sell electricity in the
event of a blackout. This condition is equivalent to ε+min{kA, kB} ≤ kA+kB
or ε ≤ max{kA, kB}, if min{kA, kB} < 1, which explains the upper bound for
integration in (13).
As we show in Appendix A, generator i’s best response is to choose a higher
capacity than its competitor (ki = 1 > kj) if the competitor’s capacity is
relatively low, and to choose a lower capacity,
ki = max{0,min{(kj − z)/(2kj), (1− z)/2}},
if the rival’s capacity is relatively high.20 This is quite intuitive, since both
residual demand and the wholesale price are large if the competitor’s capacity
is small. It therefore pays to install a large capacity. In contrast, if the
competitor’s capacity is large, it is more profitable to install a small capacity
which is completely sold and supports a higher wholesale price. The next
proposition summarizes the results for the case with simultaneous capacity
choices.
Proposition 7 (simultaneous capacity choices) With simultaneous ca-
pacity choices, the existence of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)
in pure strategies is not guaranteed.
(i) If 0 ≤ z < 1/3, there are two asymmetric SPNE in pure strategies with
capacities ksdi = 1 and ksdj = (1− z)/2, i, j = A,B and i 6= j.
(ii) If 1/3 ≤ z < 1/2, there is no SPNE in pure strategies.
Proof: Solving the system of best-response functions (25) and (26) in Ap-
pendix A for equilibrium capacities yields results (i) and (ii).
19With min{kA, kB} ≥ 1, the wholesale price is zero and none of the generators will
realize positive profits.
20See (25) and (26) in Appendix A for a detailed description of firm i’s best response
function.
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Figure 2: Best Responses in Capacities
Figure 2 illustrates that there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with
simultaneous capacity choices and high capacity costs z. The next proposi-
tion shows that this non-existence problem disappears if separated generators
choose capacities sequentially. For the sake of concreteness, it assumes that
firm A moves first.
Proposition 8 (sequential capacity choices) Suppose that firm A moves
first.
(i) If 0 ≤ z < 1/3, there is a unique SPNE in pure strategies where firm
A chooses ksdA = (1− z)/2 and firm B chooses ksdB = 1.
(ii) If 1/3 ≤ z < 1/2, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies where firm A chooses ksdA = 1− 2z and firm B chooses
ksdB = 1.
Proof: Substituting firm B’s best response function kB(kA) into ΠA(kA, kB)
in Appendix A and maximizing with respect to kA yields results (i) and (ii).
Note that the first mover, generator A, prefers to be the small-capacity firm:
The small-capacity firm bids low and sells its total capacity, whereas the
large-capacity firm, generator B, bids high, thereby determining the whole-
sale price, and serves only residual demand.
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4 Ranking Market Configurations
We rank the various market configuration with respect to aggregate capacity,
retail prices, and levels of social welfare. In doing so, we use the following
notation. The first-best optimal level of aggregative capacity is given by ks.
Under integrated monopoly, capacity is denoted as km. Under integrated
duopoly, aggregate capacity is kid = 2kˆ, whereas under separated duopoly it
is ksd = ksdA + ksdB . We use similar notation to distinguish retail prices and
levels of social welfare in the alternative market configurations.
Proposition 9 (ranking) Suppose that capacity decisions are either taken
sequentially by the separated generators or that 0 ≤ z ≤ 1/3, and that inte-
grated generators co-ordinate on the pareto-dominant competitive equilibrium.
Then the ranking of market configurations in terms of
(i) aggregate capacity levels is
ks ≥ kid ≥ ksd ≥ km; (14)
(ii) of retail prices is given by
rid ≥ rm ≥ rsd ≥ rs; (15)
(iii) and of welfare levels is given by
W s ≥ W sd ≥ Wm ≥ W id. (16)
Proof: (i) Follows from comparing Propositions 1, 2, 8 and 4. (ii) Follows
from comparing Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 3. (iii) Since blackouts do not occur
irrespective of market configuration, social welfare is given by
W (k) =
∫ 1
0
U(x(r, ε), ε)dε− zk, (17)
where k denotes total capacity. Substituting U(x(r, ε), ε) from (1), x(r, ε)
from (2) and plugging in equilibrium values for r and k for each market
configuration, yields the associated welfare levels. Comparing these welfare
levels completes the proof.
Proposition 9 shows that, compared to the social optimum, capacity levels
are inefficiently low and retail prices inefficiently high in all market config-
urations. We now want to discuss the intuition for the ranking of these
configurations.
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Let us first consider aggregate capacity levels. Result (i) shows that capac-
ity levels are highest under integrated duopoly and lowest under integrated
monopoly. The separated duopoly yields an intermediate level of aggregate
capacity. To understand this result, consider the investment incentive of
an integrated monopoly generator. Adding another integrated generator in-
troduces competition both at the wholesale and the retail level. Since an
integrated duopoly generator now faces the risk of rent extraction, it has
an incentive to increase its investment relative to the integrated monopoly
(kid > km). Next, consider the impact of vertical separation on the invest-
ment incentives of duopoly generators. After vertical separation, generators
trade with separated retailers (rather than themselves) on the wholesale mar-
ket. Since they are no longer committed to serve any predetermined level
of retail demand, generators do not face the risk of rent dissipation by their
rival, and they thus install smaller capacities than integrated duopoly gener-
ators (kid > ksd). Result (i) indicates that vertically separating the duopoly
eliminates the investment-enhancing effect of rent extraction but leaves a
positive investment effect due to introducing competition (ksd > km).
Result (ii) shows that retail prices are highest under integrated duopoly and
lowest under separated duopoly (apart from the social optimum). The inte-
grated monopoly yields an intermediate level of retail prices. The intuition
for high retail prices under integrated duopoly parallels that for high aggre-
gate capacity: Integrated duopoly generators face the risk of rent extraction
and thus have an incentive to set a high retail price to keep demand low (in
addition to making high investments to serve retail demand). This risk does
not exist under integrated monopoly or separated duopoly. Also note that
retail prices are lowest in the separated duopoly, where retail competition
disciplines retail prices.
Finally, proposition 9 (iii) indicates that the combined effects of restructur-
ing on capacity levels and prices are such that social welfare is highest un-
der separated duopoly and lowest under integrated duopoly. The integrated
monopoly yields an intermediate level of social welfare. To understand the
intuition for the result, it is important to note that, irrespective of market
configuration, aggregate installed capacity is always large enough to satisfy
retail demand at the relevant equilibrium retail price, so that blackouts do
not occur in equilibrium. This implies that raising capacity increases capacity
costs rather than supply security. These increases in capacity costs must be
weighed against the effects of changes in retail prices for the construction of
the welfare ranking. Since both total capacity and retail prices are higher in
the integrated duopoly than in the successive duopoly, welfare must be lower
in the integrated duopoly. The welfare effect of changing from integrated
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monopoly to separated duopoly is less obvious: Total capacity is higher, but
retail prices are lower in the separated duopoly. Proposition 9 (iii) shows
that the positive effect of lower retail prices dominates the negative effect of
higher capacity costs, so that the separated duopoly performs better than
the integrated monopoly.
5 Extensions and Limitations
So far, we have deliberately abstracted from a number of real-world issues to
highlight the role of vertical structure in determining generating capacities
and retail prices. In the following subsections, we consider various extensions
and limitations of our analysis.21 First, we explore the case where blackouts
may be avoided by the rationing of retail demand. Next, we consider alter-
native specifications of demand. Finally, we discuss alternative specifications
of supply.
5.1 Rationing
In practice, system operators attempt to ration retail demand to avoid (or at
least limit) blackouts. However, rationing is difficult to model as it is typically
implemented in unsystematic ways and generally not in line with theoretical
rationing models.22 By abstracting from the possibility of rationing, our
main analysis has maximized the punishment of generators for providing
insufficient capacity. We now consider the other extreme where demand
can be rationed and generators are not punished for providing insufficient
capacity.23
Specifically, we assume that if demand exceeds aggregate supply on the
wholesale market (x(r, ε) > kA + kB), blackouts may be avoided by the
rationing of retail demand. Specifically, we suppose that rationing leads to
a so-called “brownout”, that is, generators sell their total capacity to con-
sumers.24
21We are grateful to the referees for prompting us to study some of these extensions.
22For instance, in case of excess demand due to an unplanned outage of facilities (e.g.,
a power station or a transmission line), consumers in the neighborhood are temporarily
cut off from service to avoid a spread of the blackout.
23In reality, unsystematic rationing is likely to provide at least some punishment, as
valuable consumers might be cut off from service.
24Note that in our model rationing is always efficient because we have a representative
consumer model.
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5.1.1 Social Optimum With Rationing
With rationing the social planner maximizes
W (r, k) =

∫ 1
0
U(x(r, ε), ε)dε− zk if r ≥ 2− k,∫ k−1+r
0
U(x(r, ε), ε)dε+∫ 1
k−1+r U(k, ε)dε− zk if 2− k > r ≥ max{1− k, 0},∫ 1
0
U(k, ε)dε− zk if 1− k > r ≥ 0
(18)
with respect to r and k, respectively. The key difference to the welfare
function given in (5) is that consumers now get served up to capacity if
demand exceeds capacity. In this case consumers experience a brownout
rather than a blackout.
Unsurprisingly, for any given capacity level, the optimal retail price with
rationing is smaller than without rationing and effectively implies rationing
for large demand shocks. The optimal capacity is also smaller than without
rationing, inducing a retail price at the level of marginal cost (r = 0).25
5.1.2 Integrated Monopoly With Rationing
The monopolist maximizes
pi(r, k) =

∫ 1
max{r−1,0} r(1 + ε− r)dε− zk, if r ≥ 2− k,∫ k−1+r
max{r−1,0} r(1 + ε− r)dε
+
∫ 1
min{k−1+r,1} rkdε− zk, if max{0, 1− k} ≤ r
< 2− k,∫ 1
0
rkdε− zk, if r ≤ max{0, 1− k}
(19)
with respect to r and k, respectively. Again, for any given capacity level, the
profit maximizing retail price is smaller than without rationing. The chosen
capacity level is also smaller, as insufficient capacity is no longer punished.
In effect, the profit-maximizing retail price is smaller than without rationing,
and rationing kicks in for large demand shocks.26
25See proposition 10 in Appendix B.1.
26See proposition 11 in Appendix B.1 for further details.
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5.1.3 Integrated Duopoly with Rationing
The integrated generator’s retail demand is still given by equation (6). The
wholesale price that results from the price bids pA and pB continues to be
characterized by (7), with the change that the wholesale price is also deter-
mined in this way if demand exceeds aggregate capacity (i.e., kA+kB < x(r, ε)
with r = min{ri, rj}). The capacity that is dispatched in the wholesale auc-
tion is now slightly different and given by
yri (pA, pB) =

min{ki, x(r, ε)} if pi < pj,
min{ki,x(r,ε)}
2
+
min{max{0,x(r,ε)−kj},ki}
2
if pi = pj,
min {max{0, x(r, ε)− kj}, ki} if pi > pj,
(20)
with i, j = A,B and i 6= j. The profit function changes to
pii(ri, rj) = ridi(ri, rj, ε) ·min
{
1,
(ki + kj)
x(r, ε)
}
+ p(pi, pj)
[
yri (pi, pj)
−di(ri, rj, ε) ·min
{
1,
(ki + kj)
x(r, ε)
}]
. (21)
It is obvious that the profits characterized in (21) are equivalent to the profits
without rationing given in (9) if aggregate capacity is sufficient to serve retail
demand (kA+kB ≥ x(r, ε)). Moreover, there is still a risk of rent extraction in
the wholesale market: Firms compete the wholesale price down to zero if each
firm’s individual capacity is sufficient to serve its (rationed) retail demand,
as generators do not want to end up being a net payer in the wholesale
market. If one of the firms nevertheless ends up being a net payer because
of insufficient capacity, the other firm is bidding a wholesale price such that
the net payer’s profit is zero. The net payer, in turn, bids below the other
firm’s price to ensure that its payment is minimized.
Regarding retail prices, it is clear that an integrated generator cannot gener-
ate profits from undercutting if individual capacity is insufficient to cover the
ensuing market demand.27 Similarly, it is not profitable to match a larger
rival’s retail price. However, matching a smaller or equally sized competitor’s
retail price without being able to serve the ensuing retail demand does not
necessarily reduce profit to zero. With identical capacities, each firm just
sells its own capacity due to rationing, whereas with asymmetric capacities
27See Appendix B.2 for a characterization of profits for undercutting, matching and
overcharging the rival’s retail price and the resulting best responses.
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the larger firm acquires the market’s total rent as soon as the smaller firm
cannot serve its (rationed) retail demand. Analyzing the two firms’ best re-
sponses in retail prices for all reasonable capacities ki, kj ∈ [0, 2] reveals that,
despite the changes in profits due to rationing, equilibrium retail prices re-
main essentially unaffected. Specifically, Proposition 3 (i)–(iv) remain valid,
while (v) is no longer relevant as it describes blackout outcomes.
When deciding on their generating capacity, firms continue to compare prof-
its when they match their rival’s capacity (case (i) of propositon 3) with
profits when they choose zero capacity or potentially (if the rival’s capacity
is small enough) with profits from much larger capacities than their rival
(case (iii) and (iv) of propositon 3). If they go for any of the positive capac-
ity options, the resulting retail price is always such that rationing does not
kick in. Therefore, the firms’ capacity choices are always the same as in the
integrated duopoly case without rationing, and proposition 4 remains valid.
5.1.4 Separated Duopoly With Rationing
It is clear that, if rationing is not necessary, the wholesale price is still
characterized by proposition 5, cases (ii) to (iv). If rationing is necessary
(x(r∗sd, ε) > kA + kB), then retailers demand electricity on behalf of their
costumers on the wholesale market only if p ≤ r. This leads to a Nash equi-
librium with a wholesale price of p = rsd in case (i) of proposition 5, and
each firm sells its full capacity. That is, in area A of figure 1 the market no
longer breaks down, but clears with the same wholesale price as in area B,
C and D. Note, though, that the firms sell different quantities than in B, C
and D, namely, given ki < kj, yi = ki and yj = kj instead of yi = ki and
yj = x(r
sd, ε) − ki. The slightly different wholesale prices have no impact
on the retail price equilibrium described in proposition 6 or the resulting
wholesale price given in (12). Nevertheless, generator i’s profit in terms of
capacities changes, as blackouts are replaced by brownouts, and is now given
by
Πi(ki, kj) =

max{0, 1− kj}
∫ 1
0
min{ε, ki}dε− zki if ki > kj,
max{0,1−kj}
2
[∫ 1
0
min{ε, ki}dε+
∫ 1
0
kidε
]
−zki if ki = kj,
max{0, 1− ki}
∫ 1
0
kidε− zki if ki < kj,
(22)
with i, j = A,B and i 6= j instead of (13). The separated generators’ best
response functions can again be derived from their profit maximization prob-
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lems.28 Analyzing these best response functions reveals that there exists no
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for simultaneous capacity choices. There
is, however, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for sequential capacity
choices (with A choosing before B). In this setting, firm A chooses to be
the small capacity producer and firm B invests in the larger capacity. Total
capacities are again smaller than in the case without rationing, but the re-
tail price is now higher. The higher retail price is provoked by the smaller
minimal capacity in the market which determines the retail price.
5.1.5 Assessing the Role of Rationing
How does allowing for rationing affect our analysis? We have shown that
rationing does not affect the equilibrium outcome under integrated duopoly.
This is an important finding as it implies that the risk of rent extraction,
which is the driving force in our main analysis, is robust to the introduc-
tion of rationing. In the other market configurations, the introduction of
rationing tends to yield lower capacity investment, as capacity investments
no longer need to be distorted upwards to avoid blackouts. With single de-
cision makers (the social planner and the integrated monopoly) retail prices
are also lower for the same reason. In the separated duopoly retail prices
are, however, higher because the lower smaller capacity in the market shifts
the rents from the retailers to the electricity generators already at a higher
retail price. Moreover, with rationing brownouts may occur in equilibrium,
whereas blackouts do not occur in equilibrium without rationing. Yet, the
ranking of the market configurations provided in 9 remains largely unaffected.
To show this, we now consider aggregate capacity levels, retail prices, and
welfare levels, in turn, across the different market configurations. To ensure
existence of two active firms in both duopoly market configurations, we focus
on capacity costs 0 ≤ z ≤ 1/(2√2).
Aggregate Capacity Levels. For small capacity costs (0 ≤ z < 0.0267),
the ranking given in (14) remains unaffected. For larger capacity costs
(0.0276 ≤ z ≤ 1/(2√2)), there is one change in this ranking: Aggregate
capacity in the integrated duopoly is now higher than the socially optimal
level. Other than that, the ranking remains unaffected. Intuitively, the re-
sult follows from the fact that the risk of rent extraction induces integrated
duopoly generators to choose capacities such that rationing does not occur
in equilibrium. The logic of our above analysis is thus still correct.
28See Appendix B.3 and proposition 12 for the detailed results.
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Retail Prices. For the whole range of admissible capacity costs, the ranking
given in (15) remains unaffected.
Welfare Levels. The key difference to the main analysis is that, with ra-
tioning, the integrated duopoly provides a higher supply security than the
other market configuration, because the latter involve some rationing in equi-
librium. Yet, this advantage of the integrated duopoly affects the ranking
only for very low capacity costs (0 ≤ z < 0.05305), in which case the inte-
grated duopoly performs better than the monopoly but still worse than the
separated duopoly. For higher capacity costs (0.05305 ≤ z < 1/(2√2)), the
original welfare ranking given in (16) remains unaffected. That is, for most
of the parameter space, introducing rationing does not affect the results of
our main analysis.
5.2 Demand Specification
Consumer Surplus. In our main analysis, we have assumed that a positive
demand shock (ε > 0) is associated with a negative effect on consumer sur-
plus (see equation (1)). This is a natural assumption if the shock represents
the extra demand for electricity due to extra cooling (heating, respectively)
generated by, say, an extraordinarily hot (cold) day.29 Let us now consider
the case where a positive demand shock represents a boom that increases
both demand and consumer surplus. In this case, one can construct the
preferences such that demand is still represented by (2) and that the firms’
decisions are not affected.30 Of course, the social welfare benchmark is af-
fected, but it can be shown that the ranking of market configurations given
in Proposition (9) remains correct. Similarly, our focus on linear demand is
not overly restrictive. Well-behaved, concave demand functions which are
mainly shifted (rather than rotated) by demand shocks will give rise to sim-
ilar results.
Distribution of Demand Shocks. The uniform distribution assumption
for demand shocks is an important driving force of our results. Specifically, it
imposes that extreme realizations are equally likely to occur as intermediate
realizations. In such a setting, it is not surprising that firms’ decisions are
made such that, irrespective of market configuration, blackouts do not occur
in equilibrium. For distributions which make extreme realizations less likely
to occur (such as the normal), it appears more reasonable that firms allow for
29Despite the lower benefit provided by energy, consumers demand more energy to adjust
the room temperature accordingly.
30Substitute for example U(x, ε) in (1) by U˜(x, ε) = x+ ε− (x− ε)2/2 in (1).
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blackouts for very large demand shocks that arise with very small probability.
In such a setting, the incentive to make high capacity investments and charge
high retail prices in the integrated duopoly may actually become a virtue as
it leads to a higher supply security. That is, installing higher generating
capacities may be valuable per se. Future research will have to establish how
robust our results are to changes in the distribution of demand shocks.
Flexible Retail Prices. For simplicity, our analytical framework imposes
that all consumers are faced with temporarily fixed retail prices. We are well
aware that this must not necessarily be true in practice. For instance, large-
demand consumers might have concluded contracts with electricity providers
that offer options for real-time pricing, participate directly in the wholesale
market, or own their own power stations. In the future, real-time pricing may
even become viable for residential consumers, once smart metering is imple-
mented on a large scale. Yet, our framework adequately reflects the fact that
the vast majority of consumers is still faced with fixed retail prices (at least
for the foreseeable future). This implies that integrated duopoly generators
cannot avoid the risk of rent extraction by simply increasing real-time retail
prices whenever necessary. More frequent retail price changes might moder-
ate the distorted capacity and retail price outcomes of the integrated duopoly
but do not solve the problem. Note that offering so-called spot price products
is unlikely to change this: as long as these products charge consumers the
average wholesale price on the basis of a fictitious monthly demand and not
the real-time wholesale price, retail demand is effectively still fixed in the
short run and cannot be easily reduced in the event of potential exploitation
by a competitor in the wholesale market.31
5.3 Supply Specification
Electricity Generation Technologies. The above analysis focuses on the
firms’ overall incentives to invest in generating capacities and abstracts from
alternative generation technologies (such as peak-load and base-load tech-
nologies with different levels of marginal and fixed costs). The paper there-
fore does not make any statements on the extent to which the generation
portfolio varies (or is distorted) across the different market configurations.
Having said this, one might conjecture that the structure of the generation
portfolio interacts with the vertical structure via the amount of the firms’
investments in capacities. For instance, if large (small) generators tend to
31See von der Fehr and Hansen (2010) for an empirical analysis of spot price products
in Norway.
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invest more in base-load (peak-load, respectively) technology, separated (in-
tegrated) duopoly generator will tend to invest more in peak-load (base-load)
technology. Studying this issue more thoroughly is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Payments for Installed Capacity. Our main analysis focuses on energy
markets and abstracts from the possibility of payments for installed capacity.
The reason is that, even though payments or artificial markets for installed
capacities are important in the US and highly debated in the EU (Cramton
and Ockenfels (2012)), their effect depend a lot on their particular design that
varies a lot even in the US. It should be clear that introducing payments for
installed capacities increases the generators’ overall incentives to invest in
capacities. It is less clear, though, how these extra incentives interact with
vertical structure. Generally speaking, investments in generating capacity
should be expected to increase in all market configurations. However, the
relative size of the effect will depend on how the market for installed capac-
ity is organized. For instance, if the payments for installed capacity decrease
with the level of available aggregate capacity, the extra investment incen-
tive will be smallest under integrated duopoly and highest in the integrated
monopoly. The driving forces will then again be those that we described
above.
6 Conclusion
Analyzing a stylized model of the electricity market, this paper has stud-
ied the role of vertical structure in determining generating capacities and
retail prices. Our analysis identifies the risk of rent extraction associated
with vertical integration as a key determinant of equilibrium capacity levels,
retail prices, and welfare levels: An integrated generator whose capacity is
too small to serve own retail demand must buy electricity in the wholesale
market, thereby fully dissipating its rent. There is no such risk under vertical
separation, as generators are not committed to serve an uncertain level of
demand at a pre-determined retail price.
Our analysis supports the view that restructuring the electricity industry
may lead to welfare gains. In addition, it highlights that introducing compe-
tition into the electricity industry (alone) does not necessarily reduce retail
prices. The risk of rent extraction associated with vertical integration may
prevent firms from reducing their retail prices and induce them to make large
costly capacity investments. These insights are robust to the introduction of
demand rationing at the retail level.
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There is ample scope for future research. First, it would be interesting to al-
low for endogenous (and possibly asymmetric) vertical integration decisions,
as suggested by Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) and Buehler and Schmut-
zler (2008). Doing so would further enrich our understanding of the firms’
strategic investment decisions. Second, the discrimination of non-integrated
competitors has rarely been considered in the context of electricity. Third,
it would be useful to study models with different mechanisms determining
wholesale prices and with more than two competitors to better understand
the robustness of the risk of rent dissipation.
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Appendix
A Firm i’s Best Response in Capacity in a Sep-
arated Duopoly.
For kj ≥ 1 firm i’s profit function (13) translates into
Πi(ki, kj) =
−zki if ki ≥ 1,(1− ki)ki − zki if 0 ≤ ki ≤ 1. (23)
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If 0 ≤ kj < 1 holds, firm i’s profit function becomes
Πi(ki, kj) =

1−kj
2
− zki if ki ≥ 1,
(1−kj)k2i
2
− zki if kj < ki ≤ 1,
1
2
[
(1−kj)k2i
2
+ (1− ki)kikj
]
− zki if ki = kj,
(1− ki)kikj − zki if 0 ≤ ki < kj.
(24)
The best response of firm i which is derived from maximizing (23) or (24),
respectively, with respect to ki yields
ki(kj) =

1−z
2
if kj ≥ 1,
kj−z
2kj
if 1−z−
√
1−2z−2z2
3
≤ kj ≤ 1,
1 if 0 ≤ kj ≤ 1−z−
√
1−2z−2z2
3
,
(25)
for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1/3. If 1/3 < z ≤ 1/2 holds, the maximization of (23) and (24)
with respect to ki results in
ki(kj) =

1−z
2
if kj ≥ 1,
kj−z
2kj
if z ≤ kj ≤ 1,
0 if 1− 2z ≤ kj ≤ z,
1 if 0 ≤ kj ≤ 1− 2z.
(26)
B Rationing
B.1 The Social Planner’s and the Monopolist’s Capac-
ity Choice with Rationing
Proposition 10 (social optimum with rationing) The welfare maximiz-
ing retail price and capacity are given by rsr = 0 and ksr = 2−√2z.
Proof: Taking the first derivative of (18) with respect to r setting it equal
to zero and solving for r yields r = max{0, 1− k} as the optimal retail price
for a given capacity for the social planner. Substituting this into (18) and
solving the first order condition with respect to k yields the optimal capacity
given in the proposition if 0 ≤ z ≤ 1/2.
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Proposition 11 (integrated monopoly with rationing) The profit max-
imizing capacity is given by
kmr =
21− 2z
12
− (1− ı
√
3)(153 + 252z + 4z2)
24g(z)
+
(1 + ı
√
3)g(z)
24
with ı being the imaginary number32 and
g(z) ≡ (1269 + 5778z + 1188z2 − 8z3
+12
√
3
√
−4563− 7020z + 16137z2 − 7454z3 + 1272z4 − 72z5
) 1
3
.
The retail price is given by
rmr =
1
3
[2(1− kmr) +
√
1 + 4kmr + (kmr)2].
Proof: Taking the first derivative of (19) with respect to r, setting it equal
to zero and solving for r yields r = 1/3[2(1−k)+√1 + 4k + k2] as the profit
maximizing retail price for a given capacity. Substituting this into (19) and
solving the first order condition of profit maximization with respect to k
yields the profit maximizing capacity given in the proposition.
B.2 The Integrated Duopoly with Rationing.
When the firms choose their retail prices their profits depend on whether
they undercut, match or overcharge their rival’s retail price. Undercutting
yields the following expected profit net of capacity costs.
pii(ri, rj) =
{∫ min{1,ki+ri−1}
max{0,ri−1} rix(ri, ε)dε if 1− ki ≤ ri < rj,
0 if 0 ≤ ri < min{1− ki, ri},
(27)
that does not differ from the expected profit without rationing. Rationing
does not play a role because, if firm i undercuts firm j on the retail market,
firm j does not have any retail demand, and firm i supplies all consumers.
If firm i can however not serve its retail demand, firm j can exploit this on
the wholesale market and shift all the rents to firm j. This happens already
for smaller demand shocks than those for which the system operator would
start to ration demand.
32Note that for the relevant range of z the profit maximizing capacity kmr ∈ [5/4, 0]
and is a rational number that monotonously decreases in z.
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If firm i matches its rival’s retail price, then its expected profit net of capacity
costs depends on whether ki < kj, ki = kj or ki > kj holds. With ki < kj,
the structure of its expected profit does not differ from the situation without
rationing and is given by
pii
∣∣
ri=rj =
{∫ min{1,2ki+rj−1}
max{0,rj−1}
rjx(rj ,ε)
2
dε if rj ≥ 1− 2ki,
0 if 0 ≤ rj < 1− 2ki.
(28)
Due to the same logic than before nothing changes due to rationing.
However, with ki = kj, different from the no rationing case, the firm can
now continue to sell up to its capacity even if it cannot satisfy its own retail
demand and its expected profit net of capacity costs changes to
pii
∣∣
ri=rj =
∫ 1
max{0,rj−1}
rj max
{
x(rj, ε)
2
, ki
}
dε. (29)
This happens because the rival cannot exploit the firm on the wholesale mar-
ket when the firm’s retail demand exceeds its capacity because this happens
for the other firm at exactly the same demand shock.
If ki > kj then firm i, when matching firm j’s retail price, can appropriate
all its rival’s rents in the wholesale market, if firm j is not able to serve its
(rationed) retail demand because firm i is always able to serve its (rationed)
retail demand. Its expected profit net of capacity costs is then
pii
∣∣
ri=rj =

∫ 1
max{0,rj−1}
rjx(rj ,ε)
2
dε if rj ≥ 2− 2kj,∫ 2kj+rj−1
max{0,rj−1}
rjx(rj ,ε)
2
dε+∫ 1
2kj+rj−1 rj min{x(rj, ε), ki + kj}dε if 1− 2kj
< rj < 2− 2kj,∫ 1
0
rj min{x(rj, ε), ki + kj}dε if 0 < rj
< 1− 2kj.
(30)
If firm i charges a higher retail price than its rival it can only earn positive
revenues exactly in the case where its rival cannot serve the (rationed) retail
demand of its retail customers at its price rj resulting in firm i appropriating
all the rents via the wholesale auction. Thus, the expected profit net of
capacity costs is:
p¯ii(ri, rj) =

0 if ri > rj ≥ 2− kj,∫ 1
max{0,rj−1+kj} rj min{x(rj, ε),
ki + kj}dε if 0 ≤ rj
< min{ri, 2− kj}.
(31)
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When solving for the two firms best responses in retail prices it turns out
that they are close to identical with the ones derived in Boom (2007). They
are given by If firm i undercuts its rival’s retail price, its best response from
below is then
ri(rj) =

max
{
2− ki, 34
}
if rj > max
{
2− ki, 34
}
rj − µ if 0 ≤ rj ≤ max
{
2− ki, 34
} (32)
with µ→ 0 being the smallest unit in which retail prices can be announced.
If firm i sets ri > rj, then it is indifferent between all prices that satisfy this
restriction, because its profit, given in (31), does not depend on the level of
ri.
The overall best response is determined by the comparison of pii(ri(rj), rj),
derived from (27) and (32), with pii(ri, rj)
∣∣
ri=rj from (28), (29) or (30), re-
spectively, and with p¯ii(ri, rj) defined in (31).
Suppose that ki > kj. Then the overall best response of firm i for ki > kj ≥√
5− k2j is given by ri(rj) = ri(rj) from (32). For min
{
ki,
√
5− k2i
}
> kj ≥
0 the overall best response is
ri(rj)

= max
{
2− ki, 34
}
if rj > max
{
2− ki, 34
}
,
= rj − µ if rˆ < rj ≤ max
{
2− ki, 34
}
,
> rj if max{0, 1− 2kj} < rj ≤ min {rˆ,
max
{
2− ki, 34
}}
,
≥ rj if 0 < rj ≤ min {1− 2kh,
max
{
2− kj, 34
}}
.
(33)
with
rˆ =

3−
√
2(k2j+k
2
i )−1
2
if ki ≥ kj > min{
√
1− k2i , ki − 1},
1− kj if 0 ≤ kj ≤ ki − 1,
2−
√
k2j + k
2
i if 0 ≤ kj ≤ min{
√
1− k2i , ki}.
(34)
Firm j’s overall best response in retail prices is the equivalent to ri(rj) with
firm j always undercutting firm i if ki > kj ≥
√
5
2
. For min{ki,
√
5
2
} > kj ≥
33
max
{
0, ki−1
2
}
firm j’s best response in retail prices is given by
rj(ri)

= max
{
2− kj, 34
}
if ri > max
{
2− kj, 34
}
,
= ri − µ if max
{
2− kj, 34
} ≥ ri > r′i,
= ri if r′i ≥ ri > r′′i ,
> ri if r′′i ≥ ri > 0,
≥ 0 if ri = 0,
(35)
where the critical prices r′i and r′′i for the rival with the larger capacity is
defined as:
r′i = max
3−
√
4k2j − 1
2
, 2−
√
2kj
 , (36)
and
r′′i = max
3−
√
4k2i − 1
2
,
5−
√
12k2j + 6k
2
i − 2
3
, 0
 (37)
for ki > 1,
r′′i =

max
{
3−
√
4k2i−1
2
,
5−
√
12k2j+6k
2
i−2
3
}
if ki ≥ kj ≥
√
1−k2i
2
,
2−
√
2k2j + k
2
i if
√
1−k2i
2
> kj ≥ 0
(38)
for 1√
2
< ki ≤ 1 and
r′′i = max
{
2−
√
2ki, 2−
√
2k2j + k
2
i
}
(39)
for 0 ≤ ki < 1√2 .
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For ki−1
2
> kj > 0 firm j’s best response in retail prices is
rj(ri)

= 2− kj if ri > 2− kj,
= ri − µ if 2− kj ≥ ri > r′i,
= ri if r′i ≥ ri ≥ 1− 2kj,
≥ 0 if 1− 2kj > ri ≥ 2− ki,
> ri if 2− ki > ri > 0,
≥ 0 if ri = 0,
(40)
where r′j is defined in (36).
Now suppose that kA = kB = k, then each firm has the same best response
in retail prices. If k >
√
5
2
, then both firms’ overall best response is given by
ri(rj) from equation (32). If 0 ≤ k <
√
5
2
, then each firm’s best response in
retail prices is given by:
ri(rj) =

= max
{
2− k, 3
4
}
if rj > max
{
2− k, 3
4
}
,
= rj − µ if max
{
2− k, 3
4
} ≥ rj > rˆ
≥ rj if rj = rˆ
> rj if rˆ > rh > 0,
≥ 0 if rj = 0,
(41)
with rˆ from (34) with ki = kj = k. Then again there is always a Nash
equilibrium with rA = rB = 0. Since the Nash equilibria in retail prices
depend on when these best response functions change from undercutting to
matching and then to overbidding, and since the retail prices at which this
happens do not change, the possible Nash equilibria in retail prices are also
close to the same as in proposition 3 with the exception of case (v) where
now the only possible Nash equilibrium in retail prices implies ri = rj = 0.
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B.3 The Separated Duopoly with Rationing
Firm i′s best response with i = A,B can be derived from maximizing the
profit function (22). It is given by
ki =
{
1− z
1−kj if kj ≤ (3−
√
1 + 8z)/4,
min
{
kj − , 1−z2
}
if kj > (3−
√
1 + 8z)/4,
(42)
with  → 0. The best response function is downward sloping, jumps down-
ward at the given threshold and finally increases up to the given limit.
Proposition 12 (separated duopoly with rationing) If the two genera-
tors A and B simultaneously choose their capacities, a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. If firm A chooses kA before
firm B chooses kB, then a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists
with kA = (3 −
√
1 + 8z)/4 and kB = (3 −
√
1 + 8z)/2 and a retail price of
rsdr = (1 +
√
1 + 8z)/4.
Proof: The non-existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies with simultaneous capacity choice follows from the analysis of the
two best response functions given in (42). The unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium with sequential capacity choice is derived from the piecewise
analysis of firm A’s profit function after substituting firm B’s best response.
The retail price is still characterized by proposition 6. Taking into account
Assumption 2 and substituting firm A’s equilibrium capacity yields then the
retail price for the sequential capacity choice case.
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